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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JANETTE DEEBEN ) j -
Plaintiff-Appellant ) Case No. 880104-CA 
vs. ) Priority 14b 
DERICK R. DEEBEN ) j, 
Defendant-Respondent ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND THE NATURE 
OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
Jurisdiction for the Court of Appeals to hear this 
case is governed by Section 78-2a-3(2)(g), Utah Code, as 
amended. The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction 
over appeals from the district court involving domestic 
relations cases including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, support and 
visitation, adoption and paternity. 
By original order on November 13, 1987, the Second 
Judicial District Court for Davis County, Utah, granted an 
Order of divorce to the parties herein, including a joint 
custody order for two minor children, with the defendant 
having primary custody of the minor child, Heather Deeben, 
and the plaintiff having primary custody of the minor child, 
Kevin Deeben. 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
entered. 
On December 31, 1987, the plaintiff made application 
to the trial court for a stay of Judgment, and upon hearing, 
January 19, 1988, the Courtfs order was entered that the 
primary custody of Heather should remain with the defendant 
and that the primary custody of Kevin should remain with the 
plaintiff. 
It was further ordered that the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law be amended by the inclusion of a complete 
transcript of the Courts bench ruling of November 13, 1987. 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce was then entered on 
January 20, 1988. On February 5, 1988, the plaintiff filed 
a Notice of Appeal in the District Court. 
Upon Plaintifffs motion in the Court of Appeals, the 
case was remanded to the District Court with directions to 
amend the Findings of Fact to reflect the Court fs 
determination of the "best interests of the child" under 
standards articulated in case law and to further enter 
judgment if necessary. The Court of Appeals retained 
jurisdiction for further consideration on the merits of the 
appeal. 
On November 2, 1988, the trial court entered Amended 
Findings of Fact and made additional findings, but did not 
change its Judgment. It directed the Court Clerk to return 
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the file to the Court of Appeals, and this was done on 
November 18, 1988. 
The Court of Appeals then directed that the 
Appellant's brief be served and filed on or before December 
18, 1988. The brief was submitted on the 16th day of 
December and the Respondent's brief is due January 15, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The defendant/respondent chooses to make his own 
statement of the issues as follows: 
1. The trial Court was not bound to accept as its 
own the Conclusions of a home Study and Custody evaluation 
made by order of the Court in not crediting the testimony of 
witnesses whom the trial Court was free to credit, regarding 
the plaintiff's past behavior and the effect on the 
children. 
2. The trial Court has an independent 
responsibility to assure itself of the suitability of the 
parent to whom a child is primarily attached. Relative 
weight of various factors in a particular case to determine 
custody lies within the discretion of the trial court. 
3. Title 30-3-10, Utah Code, as amended, states the 
proper basis for decision in the first instance of a custody 
determination. 
4. The record does not support the plaintiff's 
claim that the trial court's determination of custody was 
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motivated by a desire to punish the plaintiff rather than by 
its' concern for the child's best interests. 
5. The authority to exercise the judicial 
discretion under the circumstances revealed by the finding 
is conferred upon the trial court. Nothing short of a clear 
abuse of discretion can warrant interference with that 
Court's order. 
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE. 
30-3-10, Utah Code, as amended. Custody of children 
in case of separation or divorce - custody consideration (as 
set forth in the Addendum below). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a divorce proceeding; trial was had before 
the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby in the Second Judicial 
District Court for Davis County. The Decree of Divorce was 
entered on January 20, 1988, and not changed on November 2, 
1988, after remand by the Court of Appeals. Additional 
Findings of Fact were made on November 2, 1988. 
Plaintiff/Appellant appeals the custody award of Heather 
Deeben, a minor child, to the defendant/respondent. 
The Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff filed a Complaint for divorce on January 
12, 1987. The defendant was personally served on January 
23, 1987, in Bell County, Texas. On May 26, 1987, the 
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defendant filed his answer and Counterclaim for divorce. 
The plaintiff filed a reply on June 3, 1987. 
A pre-trial settlement hearing was held August 12, 
1987, establishing the issues for trial as "Custody, 
visitation, plaintiff's wedding rings, alimony, debts and 
attorney fees". Temporary custody and child support to the 
plaintiff and child visitation to the defendant were 
stipulated to. The pre-trial order provided for the 
paternal grandparents to have standard visitation "when 
defendant is in Texas". Visitation was further ordered by 
the Court on September 28, 1987. Witnesses at trial were 
Janette Deeben for the plaintiff, and Derick Deeben, Carlene 
Deeben and Bruce Van Dyke Deeben for the defendant. 
Disposition in the Court below 
The grounds for divorce were amended to be 
irreconcilable differences. The Court granted a mutual 
divorce to both parties. There was no alimony awarded to 
either party. The Court awarded joint custody of the minor 
children with the physical custody of Heather to the 
defendant and the physical custody of Kevin to the 
plaintiff. The defendant was ordered to pay monthly 
children support to the plaintiff for Kevin. The Court did 
not make a determination at this time for child support for 
Heather. The custody for Heather was to change on the 
Sunday following the order. The change took place. 
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The plaintiff moved for a stay of the order which 
was denied on January 19, 1988, and the divorce decree was 
entered January 20, 1988. The decree awarded joint custody 
of both minor children and ordered that each share with one 
another, any and all medical matters, school matters, 
church matters or social matters involving the minor 
children. 
Statement of Facts Relevant to the issues Presented 
The parties to this action were married on September 
6, 1984, at a time when they were 19 and 20 years old. The 
wife was the older one. Both were pursuing educational 
goals at the time. They lived together at Logan, and he 
worked at Trimiller Packing Company. 
At the end of 1985, the plaintiff went to live in 
Roy with the child, Heather, and the defendant went to New 
Jersey with the United States Army. Both parties expected 
to further family finances and meet the defendants future 
educational goals. (Transcript: page 127, Lines 9-14) They 
rejoined each other at Ft. Hood, Texas, in 1986. 
However, the plaintiff/appellant did not adjust to 
army life. She did not eat well and she barely fed Heather 
or attend to the childfs needs. (Transcript page 113-114). 
She left Texas in October, 1986, but returned in November. 
Plaintiff left the defendant and Texas for good at 
the end of December, 1986, and brought this divorce action 
on January 12, 1987. (record page 1) 
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The army has chaplains (transcript page 113, Lines 
14-15), compassionate assignments (transcript page 93, Line 
14), hardship discharges (transcript page 92, Line 19) and 
reserve army units (transcript page 99, Lines 12-13). The 
defendant sought help with his family problems from the 
army. In March, 1987, he did visit Utah, but had to return 
to Texas. In July, 1987, the defendant received a hardship 
discharge from the Army and a reserve unit assignment in 
Utah. This was honorable service. (transcript page 99, 
line 4) 
The Plaintiff/Appellant has suggested that the trial 
court has acted in an intemperate and angry manner in 
finding both parties fit and proper persons to be custodial 
parents and in expressing a need for cooperation in the care 
of their children. 
In the bench ruling of November 13, 1987, the judge 
states: 
"... I just explain why I am doing what I am 
doing. It's not to be cruel . . . but to 
let you know why I did what I did and its not 
always kind . . . 
(Record: p. 131, lines 9-12) 
and, "those are my reasons". 
(Record: P. 139, Line 10) 
Among those reasons: 
(a) " . . . each party is an equal contributor 
in whatever (their) inability to get along. 
(Record: P. 133, Lines 1 & 2) 
-7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(b) " . . . the husband has reacted violently 
on times. 
(Record: P. 133, Line 6) 
(c) "I don't condone it. 
(Record: P. 133, Line 11 
(d) " . . . the wife was often the agitator and 
often the instigator. 
(Record: P. 133, Lines 18 & 19) 
(e) "I am absolutely satisfied that both parties 
love the children. 
(Record: P. 134, Lines 8 & 9) 
(f) "I am not sure one would be any more prime 
(as caretaker) than the other 
(Record: P. 134, Lines 20 & 21) 
(g) " . . . he was with the child and did things 
with the child." 
(Record: P. 135, lines 1 and 2) 
(h) "Both these parties have got these children to 
care for and they are both trying to get through 
school and both finding the necessity of working .." 
(Record: P. 136, Lines 5-7) 
(i) "In Texas ... the Court does not believe 
Janette primarily cared for the child Heather." 
(Record: P. 137, lines 19 and 20) 
(j) "... he recognized the problem to immediately 
do something about it." 
(Record: P. 138, lines 4 & 5) 
(k) "I can't exclude, Janette, the threats of 
suicide. I donft have to believe that they were 
serious, but they are certainly suggestive of 
psychological problems . . ." 
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(Record: P. 138, line 10) 
(1) "I tend to believe that you (Janette) were 
using paregoric improperly . . . " 
(Record: P. 138, Lines 18 & 19). 
(m) "The wife's home seems to be almost too 
crowded . . . " 
(Record: P. 139, Lines 4 and 5) 
As to the matter of Visitation: 
(a) "The children are to be in the same home each 
time there is weekend visitation." 
(Record: P. 127, Lines 22 and 23) 
(b) "For summer visitation . . . each party should 
have an opportunity of having both children in the 
home for an uninterrupted period of time ... a full 
month." 
(Record: P. 6, Lines 3-6) 
(c) "In the visitation . . . where one child is 
in each home, I suppose you just have to be . . . 
reasonable." 
(Record: P. 136, Lines 23-25) 
(d) "I don't think that the defendant and his 
parents having always been given the visitation 
under the Court's Order that they had a right to." 
(Record: P. 137, Lines 15-17) 
and, "I think Heather will be best cared for if she is in 
the home with his (the father's) parents." 
(Record: P. 128, lines 20-25) 
Under the provisions of 30-3-10(2), Utah Code, as 
amended, these are relevant and reasoned deliberations. 
These are not the pre-conceived pronouncements of an 
intemperate and angry judge. In awarding custody, the court 
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has considered which person is most likely to act in the 
best interests of the child, including allowing the child 
frequent and continuing contacts with the non-custodial 
parent. 
The trial court heard testimony by Derick Deeben 
that the plaintiff did not care for the child in Texas. 
(Transcript: P. 82, Lines 20-25; Page 83, lines 8-13), and 
that the care had improved somewhat on the plaintiff's final 
return to Utah (Transcript: P. 85, Lines 4-12). However, 
another pattern of injury to Heather emerged (Transcript: 
P. 85, Lines 23-25; Page 86, Lines 1-25; Page 87, Lines 1-
24) . Heather had been medicated with paregoric for an 
extended period of time as well. (transcript: P. 89, Lines 
3-25.) 
Charlene Deeben testified as to the effects of the 
child's experience with the paregoric (Transcript: P. 120, 
Lines 1-25; Page 121, Lines 1-25: Page 122, Lines 1-25, and 
Page 123, Lines 1-10.) 
The witness, Deeben, is a registered nurse with 
training in making the observations testified to. 
(Transcript: P 123, lines 12-24 and page 124, lines 20-23.) 
The trial court found the concerns of the 
defendant/respondent justified and found that the hardship 
discharge from the army was motivated for a concern for the 
welfare of his children and the necessity for him to return 
to Utah. (Record: Page 135, Lines 1-6; page 137, lines 18-
-10-
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25; page 131, lines 13-24). (Transcript: Page 96, liens 3-
19) That was a primary reason why he left the military 
service. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court has the independent responsibility 
and duty to make findings and draw conclusions from those 
findings as to an award of child custody. In an initial 
determination of custody in the divorce proceeding, the 
standard for determination is that enacted by the 
Legislature in 30-3-10, Utah Code. Change of circumstance 
is not a threshold requirement in making the determination. 
The trial Court has wide discretion in weighing the 
circumstances found from the evidence and the credibility of 
the witnesses. Gender bias is not to be indulged in and the 
best interests of the child is weighed by all of the 
relevant factors, only one of which is the identity of a 
psychological parent. In some cases it may be a 
disadvantage for the child to be in the care of the 
psychological parent. 
Moreover, the issue on appeal is not whether the 
trial court's exercise of its discretion accords with the 
views of a reviewing court on the circumstances, but whether 
its findings are supported by substantial evidence, so long 
as it is not so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse 
of discretion. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT IS FREE TO RELY ON 
WHATEVER PARTS OF AN EXPERTS OPINION 
THE COURT FINDS PROBATIVE AND HELPFUL. 
On the issue of custody of the parties two minor 
children, the Court found that both the plaintiff, mother 
and defendant, father were proper, fit and good parents. 
Having to choose between them, the court concluded that the 
defendant, father was in a better position, with the aid of 
his parents, to provide a stable home life for the older 
child. 
On her appeal from the Judgment, the plaintiff 
argues that the Home Study and Custody Evaluation ordered by 
the Court which was in the proceedings before the Court, 
recommended that custody of both minor children be awarded 
to the plaintiff. That report also noted, however, that 
both the plaintiff and the defendant had at times used poor 
judgment and both have misgivings about the parenting 
abilities of the other. Also, the report discredited 
testimony by the defendant of abuse of the child Heather 
when in the temporary custody of the plaintiff. This was 
testimony which the trial court was free to credit regarding 
the plaintiffs behavior and its effect on the child. 
It would be anomalous to require a trial court to 
assign particular weight to a report which is based on 
statements that the trial court may evaluate differently and 
-12-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on circumstances that may have changed. The best interests 
of the child does not permit such a predetermined weighing 
of evidence. 
The weight to be given to psychological reports by 
professionals in mental health is, in matters of custody, as 
it is elsewhere, a question for the trier of fact. Expert 
opinion must be evaluated in light of the expert's 
opportunity to come to a reasoned conclusions. Long-range 
forecasts about future child development are sometimes based 
upon relatively few and brief interviews and tests conducted 
under circumstances of stress. See: Martinez vs. Martinez 
652 P2d 934, (Ut - 1982). 
A Court has an independent responsibility to assure 
itself of the suitability of the parent to whom the child is 
primarily attached. On this record , the trial court 
exercised that responsibility. 
POINT II 
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO 
DETERMINE NOT WHICH PARENT WAS 
THE BETTER CUSTODIAN IN THE PAST 
BUT WHICH IS THE BETTER CUSTODIAN 
NOW. 
In the exercise of awesome responsibility to find 
the most-likely custodial arrangement for the children of 
divorce, the court must take into account the parents' past 
behavior. It must evaluate their present and future 
parenting ability and the consistency of their parenting for 
the purpose of determining which parent will better foster 
-13-
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the childrens' growth, development, and well-being. See: 
30-3-10(1) and (2), Utah Code, as amended (1988). 
Where, as here, the record is void of any previous 
determination of custody, the court will apply the standard 
in Sec. 30-3-10 in lieu of the standard for change of 
custody outlined in Hoaae vs. Hoaae and its' progeny. 
Sanderson vst Tyyon, 739 P2d 623 (Ut - 1987). 
Temporary custody of the children had been 
stipulated to the plaintiff before trial, but the custody of 
the children was to be an issue at trial. The circumstances 
had not been determined. There was no reason to find a 
change of circumstances to change custody. In fact, custody 
was not changed; it was determined in the first instance. 
Although there was evidence favoring an award of 
custody to the plaintiff/Appellant, the award of the custody 
of Heather to the Defendant/Respondent was not flagrantly 
unjust nor an abuse of discretion. In some cases it is a 
disadvantage for the child to be in the care of the 
psychological parent, as the trial court has found. 
The plaintiff was not an ideal caretaker. Speaking 
of Heather as an only child at the time, she was not always 
properly fed, diapered, or put to bed. The 
defendant/respondent, spent as much time as a caretaker when 
he was in the home. (Record: p. 151-152). It has been 
specifically found that the plaintiff/appellant used 
paregoric on Heather, after the birth of the second child, 
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when it was not medically necessary. This made the child 
lethargic and unable to sleep properly and neared the point 
of being habit forming. (Record: P. 152) In addition, the 
evidence shows that the newborn child could ingest paragoric 
from his mother's milk. There was evidence of past behavior 
by the plaintiff/appellant suggestive of psychological 
problems. 
The Plaintiff/appellant has responded better as a 
caretaker with counsel and assistance. (Record P. 152). 
The custody award by the Court has spread the load and 
provided counsel and assistance over a long period of time 
pending any change in circumstances. 
Moreover, if the findings seem terse, but still 
suggest the weight accorded to the testimony of the 
witnesses by the trial court and outline the basis of the 
custody award, appellate review can find that there was 
competent evidence to support the judgment. Pennington vs 
Pennington, 711 P2d 254 (Ut - 1985). 
Should it appear at some future time that 
circumstances have changed to the extent that the child's 
interests and welfare will be best served by a review of 
custody, the matter may again be brought to the trial court 
upon a proper petition and showing. Fontenot vs. Fontenot, 
714 P2d 1131 (Utah, 1986) 
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POINT III 
EVERY APPEAL IS NOT A SECOND CHANCE 
TO ACCOMPLISH WHAT SHOULD BE DETER-
MINED AT TRIAL. 
In initial custody awards, the trial court is given 
broad discretion. Appellate review of the findings is made 
under a "clearly erroneous" standard. Davis vs. Davis. 749 
P2d 647 Ut, 1988). 
It is a rare case in which a disappointed litigant 
will be able to demonstrate abuse of a trial courts broad 
discretion in family matters. 
The authority to exercise the judicial discretion 
under the circumstances revealed by the Findings is not for 
the appellate court, but upon the trial court. A mere 
difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify appellate 
court intervention short of a conviction that the action of 
the trial court is one which discloses a clear abuse of 
discretion. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Alexander vs. Alexander 
737 P2d 221 (Ut- 1987), Note 1 page 223, notes: 
"Plaintiff urges us to apply our usual standard 
of review only in cases in which the trial court 
clearly applied the appropriate guidelines and 
rules, but to substitute our judgment for that of 
the trial court "materially or substantially" 
deviated from the best interests of the child rule. 
We think that standard would be ill-advised and 
would simply confuse the issue by forcing us to 
determine what is in the best interests of the child 
and then determine if the trial court materially and 
-16-
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substantially deviated from the decision we would 
have reached. Such a standard would be inapprop-
riate and render every appeal a second chance to 
accomplish what should have been determined at trial 
Where there is evidence to support a ruling the task 
of determining the best interests of the child in a custody 
dispute is for the trial judge, who has the opportunity to 
personally observe and evaluate the witnesses. 
POINT IV 
ASSESSMENTS OF THE APPLICABILITY AND 
RELATIVE WEIGHT OF THE VARIOUS FACTORS 
IN A PARTICULAR CASE LIE WITHIN THE 
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
The plaintiff/appellant argues that the trial court, 
as function related factors in custody awards, has (1) split 
custody of the two siblings, (2) interfered with previous 
custody arrangements, (3) overlooked the element of the 
personal care to be provided for Heather, and (4) failed to 
give proper deference to the element of the primary 
caretaker, all to the detriment of, and against the best 
interests of the minor child, Heather. 
Function related factors were outlined by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Hutchison vs. Hutchison. 649 P2d 38 (Ut -
1982) at P.41, with the factors not necessarily listed in 
any particular order of importance. 
Also, in Hutchison, the Court states that 
assessments of the applicability and relative weight of the 
various factors in a particular case lie within the 
discretion of the trial court. 
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However, it is well established that only where the 
trial court action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute 
an abuse of that discretion should the appellant forum 
interpose its own judgment. Under Hutchison the 
applicability of the factors varies with the circumstances 
found by the trial court. 
In the later case of Pusev vs. Pusey, 728 P2d 117 
(Ut - 1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the time has 
come to discontinue support, even in dictum, for the notion 
of gender based preference in child custody cases. The 
choice instead should be based on function related factors. 
The identity of the primary caretaker during the marriage is 
prominent, though not exclusive. Another important factor 
should be the stability of the environment provided by each 
parent. 
Also, in Pusey, at page 120, it observes that where 
the trial court found both parties to be fit custodial 
parents, its ultimate judgment on custody required an 
assessment of the complex situation before it. That choice 
is within its discretion. 
In the instant case, the trial court assessed all of 
the factors. It made findings as to the primary caretaker, 
the prospects for personal care and the splitting of custody 
for the siblings. It determined that the element of the 
psychological parent was outweighed by other considerations. 
Moreover, bonding between the siblings was not great. In 
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Pusey, and many other cases, the court has affirmed split 
custody arrangements. 
Both parties have shortcomings. Both testified as 
to their work patterns and their desire to continue with 
their schooling. (Transcript pages 5, 9, 90, 97) The 
defendant testified as to his intention to complete an 
apartment for him and the children in the basement of his 
parent's home in Salem. (Transcript p. 112.) The plaintiff 
testified as to her objective to afford an apartment of her 
own near her parents home, and perhaps have the aid of her 
mother and sisters with child care. (Transcript, p. 47.) 
As to all of this, and to other weighty factors of 
stress upon each of the parties, the trial court stated its 
purpose to facilitate visitation. (Record: P. 136, lines 23-
25); P. 125, lines 22-25), and that Heather will be best 
cared for if she is in the home of the defendant's parents. 
(Record 128, Lines 24 and 25). 
The trial court weighed all of the factors raised by 
the plaint iff/appellant, and others of its choosing, and it 
made its order accordingly. 
Moreover, the order is in keeping with the standards 
set out by the legislature in 30-3-10(2) Utah Code as 
amended. The judge has determined which parent is most 
likely to act in the best interests of the child, and has 
included an allowance for frequent and continuing contact 
with the non-custodial parent as well as the two siblings. 
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The order is well crafted in both regards, and as the court 
finds appropriate. There is no abuse of discretion here. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Many of the circumstances of this case are 
regrettable, but they are common enough. The trial court 
must often weigh the least detrimental available 
alternative. 
The Plaintiff/appellant has made no showing legally 
sufficient to require reversal of the trial courts1 custody 
order. It is the trial court that must exercise the 
judicial discretion to determine what is in the best 
interests of a child. On the record here awarding custody 
of the minor child Heather to her father is not so unjust as 
to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
The custody order of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this /Q day of January, 1989. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served four copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent to ROBERT L. NEELEY, Attorney 
for Appellant, 2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah, 
84401 this 17th day of January, 1989.-
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UTAH CODE, AS AMENDED 
30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separa-
tion or divorce — Custody consider-
ation. 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children 
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or 
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future 
care and custody of the minor children as it considers 
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall 
consider the best interests of the child and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of 
the parties. The court may inquire of the children and 
take into consideration the children's desires regard- | 
ing the future custody, but the expressed desires are j 
not controlling and the court may determine the chil-
dren's custody otherwise. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, j 
among other factors the court finds relevant, which j 
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the | 
child, including allowing the child frequent and con- j 
tinuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the i 
court finds appropriate. 1988 
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Janette Deeben, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Derick R. Deeben, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
*.^ ,\r: -1 ;,LL7i!iJi.CLEFKcfe
 w.i;i ;?i.LLcr.i-.UTr!r<::>.e court 
ORDER ,;.; u ' 
Case No. 880104-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme and Greenwood (On Law and Motion) 
This matter is before the Court on appellant's Motion for 
Summary Disposition seeking reversal of the trial court's child 
custody determination on the basis of manifest error. This 
Court, having reviewed the record and the material submitted by 
the parties, and having heard oral argument on the motion now 
pending, makes the following determination. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT appellant's Motion for Summary 
Disposition on the basis of manifest error is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the case is remanded to the trial 
court with directions to amend the findings of fact to reflect 
the court's determination of the "best interests of the child" 
under the standards articulated in case law and to enter judgment 
accordingly. R. Utah Ct. App. 30(a); Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 
423 (Utah 1986); Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982); 
Hogge v. Hogae, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982). 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT this Court shall retain 
jurisdiction for further consideration of the merits of this 
appeal following entry of the amended findings and conclusions 
and an amended judgment. 1 
1. If appellant wishes to pursue the appeal after the lower 
court proceedings, a new notice of appeal need not be filed. 
Appellant instead should notify this Court and supplement the 
record as required, and a new briefing schedule will be issued 
by the Clerk of the Court. Our retention of jurisdiction means 
that appellant's issues concerning the propriety of the custody 
determination remain viable if not rendered moot by the new 
proceedings. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 n.2 
(Utah 1987). If respondent chooses to appeal from any decision 
after remand, he must initiate a new appeal. 
'•^iq ^ ^ ' - - ^ ^ 
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DATED this 2*1? day of April, 1988, 
FOR THE COURT: 
Nocman H. Jackson, Judge 
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DALE E. STRATFORD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
1218 First Security Bank Bldg 
Ogden, Utah, 84401 
Telephone: 393-7085 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AMENDED 
JANETTE DEEBEN ) FINDINGS OF FACT and 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil 40735 
DERICK R. DEEBEN ) 
Defendant. ) 
The above entitled matter having come on regularly 
for hearing on the 13th day of November, 1987, and plaintiff 
appearing and being represented by her attorney, ROBERT L. 
NEELEY, and the defendant appearing and being represented by 
his attorney, DALE E. STRATFORD and each of the parties 
having called and presented witnesses and the Court having 
considered all evidence presented to it, including the 
written report of Steven L. Watson, psychotherapist, and 
having considered the argument of counsel, the Court now 
therefore enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. That the plaintiff was a resident of Davis 
County, Utah for a period in excess of three months prior to 
the filing of this action. 
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\ 
3. That as a result of the marriage between the 
parties two children have been born as issue of the 
marriage, to wit: HEATHER LYN DEEBEN, born March 1, 1985 
and KEVIN ROY DEEBEN, born July 1, 1987. 
4. That since the marriage and particularly during 
the last number of months the parties have developed 
irreconcilable differences and each of the parties are 
entitled to be granted a divorce, one from the other. 
5. That the each of the parties are equally capable 
of supporting the family as the other and the plaintiff, 
having made arrangements to work outside the home and the 
defendant having made arrangements to complete his 
education, the Court finds that no alimony need be awarded 
to either party. 
6. The Court finds that the defendant is not 
delinquent in any of his child support obligations up to the 
time of the granting of the divorce and specifically finds 
that the August, 1987 payment of $240.00 was paid as well as 
the other monthly obligations which the Court had ordered to 
be paid. 
7. The Court finds that each of the parties are fit 
and proper persons to have the care, custody and control of 
the minor children and the Court finds that each of the 
parties should be awarded joint custody of the two minor 
children, with the defendant having primary Care for the 
minor child Heather and the plaintiff having primary care 
for the minor child Kevin. It being the specific intention 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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t 
of the Court that each of the parties share with one 
another, any and all medical matters, school matters, church 
matters or social matters involving the minor children• 
The Court further finds as follows: 
A. The children's best interests and the special 
attributes of the parents determine the primary care and 
custody specified above, 
B. At this time, the children's feelings are not 
susceptible to making an expression of choice between 
parents. 
C. The child, Kevin, has a special need to be with 
the plaintiff while nursing. 
D. The child Heather has no particular special need 
to be with the plaintiff 
£• There is no particular special need created by 
any bond between siblings, there being no particular 
attachment of the sister to the new born brother at this 
time. 
F. The general interest of the child Heather is any 
particular current environment is not great. She is happy 
and well adjusted in the defendant's care. 
G. The character or stutus of both parents is the 
same. 
H. The capacity or willingness to act as the 
custodial parent for Heather is very great in the defendant. 
I. The moral character of both parents is the same. 
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J. Both parties exhibit emotional immaturity to 
some degree. However, the plaintiff has expressed suicidal 
tendencies on at least two occasions. 
K. The depth of desire to be a responsible parent 
has been exhibited by the defendant. He gave up what would 
have been a good job in the military for the possibility of 
having custody of his children. He took a hardship 
discharge from the military so that he could hopefully have 
custody of one or both of these children. 
L. Personal care for Heather will be shared with 
one or the other set of grandparents, no matter which party 
has primary custody. Both parents are limited by work and 
school. The plaintiff is further limited by the needs of 
the infant child Kevin. 
M. Neither party suffers from impairment. Both 
parties love the children and want what is best for the 
children. 
N. Past custody patterns and the role of primary 
caretaker must be put into the context of the defendants 
military service. Had he not been in the military, both 
parents would have ranked as jointly being caretakers. 
0. When the parties were together in Texas, the 
plaintiff did not provide primary care for Heather 
exclusively. Instances of diaper rash, the unwise use of 
paregoric on the child, meal patterns and neglect were 
ameliorated by the defendants concern to be with Heather, to 
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do things with the child, and to do things for these 
problems. 
P. The plaintiff left the defendant in Texas, 
taking the children with her, and returned to her parent's 
home in Utah. Since then there have been indications of 
bruising on Heather. 
Q. Religious factors rank equally with either 
party. 
R. Kinship factors rank equally with either party. 
S. Housing conditions for Heather are better with 
the defendant, and are somewhat constricted with the 
plaintiff. The defendant and his parents were not always 
given the visitation that they had a right to under the 
Court's preliminary orders with custody in the plaintiff. 
For the child, Heather to enjoy the association of both 
parents in the future, primary custody is better in the home 
of the defendant. 
T. Each party is an equal contributor in whatever 
inability to get along in the marriage has been; no one more 
or less than the other. Both parties looked to "mom and 
dad11 for decisions better made by the parties together. 
U. Cooperation and the give and take in making 
decisions for the children will be facilitated with primary 
custody of Heather being with the defendant. 
8. The court finds that neither party has Health 
and Accident and/or dental insurance coverage for the 
children at this time. Each should be required to pay one-
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half of all medical costs that are incurred by each child in 
each home. 
9. Defendant is capable of paying $80.00 per month 
as and for child support for the minor child Kevin, which 
child resides in the home of the plaintiff. The Court will 
hold in abeyance any order that the plaintiff pay to the 
defendant child support for the support of the minor child 
Heather. The court would find, however, that at such time 
as the plaintiff finishes her schooling, that the Court 
would expect the Uniform Child Support Schedule to apply in 
determining the child support that the plaintiff would be 
required to pay to the defendant for the support of the 
minor child Heather. As the defendants earning capacity 
increases the Uniform Child Support Schedule should be used 
to determine the support to be paid to the plaintiff for the 
support of the minor child Kevin. 
10. The Court further finds that there should be 
an evaluation of the child support on the 1st of January of 
each year to determine if the Uniform Schedule should 
dictate a payment of a greater child support than that 
heretofore ordered by the Court. 
11. The Court further finds that visitation for 
the children and the parents should be as follows: 
The Plaintiff shall visit with the minor child 
Heather every other weekend and have alternate holidays. 
The defendant shall have visitation rights with the minor 
child Kevin for 45 minutes prior to the time that the minor 
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child Heather is delivered to the home of the plaintiff and 
45 minutes when the defendant arrives at the home of the 
plaintiff to pick up the minor child Heather. Provided, 
however, the defendant may, if he so desires, visit with the 
minor child Kevin, between the hours of 3:00 p.m. and 7:00 
p.m. on Saturday. If the defendant is going to exercise the 
visitation rights from 3:00 to 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, the 
plaintiff should be notified 24 hours in advance. However, 
after a period of one year, then the minor children shall 
visit with both of the parents on alternate weekends. It 
being the specific desire of* the Court that both children be 
in the home of the same parent on weekends so that each of 
the parents will have the opportunity to have both children 
together in their home on alternate weekends. It is the 
intent of the Court that for the first year that the 
defendant make the necessary arrangements to deliver the 
child Heather to the home of the plaintiff, inasmuch as 
there is substantial travel distance between the homes of 
the two parties. Provided further, however, after a period 
of one year, the transportation of the minor children shall 
alternate. One weekend it would be the responsibility of 
the plaintiff and the other the responsibility of the 
defendant. 
Summer vacation with the minor children should 
include a full month in each of the homes of both parents, 
so that the mother would have both children in her home from 
June 15th to July 15th of each year. Provided, however, that 
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one weekend in the middle of the month, the defendant would 
pick up both children for that weekend. The defendant 
should have both children in his home between July 16th and 
August 15th, provided however, the plaintiff would have one 
weekend with the children in the middle of the month. Each 
of the parties are to notify the other party as to which 
weekend during the summer visitation they would desire to 
exercise their visitation with the minor children. 
The Court believes and finds, as a matter of fact, 
that there are special events in the lives of both parties, 
such as family reunions and other activities which may not 
fall on the appropriate weekend or during the summer month 
visitation, and consideration for each others needs as to 
special events should in fact be considered and if possible, 
accommodated or schedules so arranged by both parties to 
meet those needs and desires so far as visitation with the 
minor children. 
12. The Court further finds that each of the 
parties are capable of paying their own attorney fees and 
costs incurred in connection with this matter. 
13. The Court further finds that certain property, 
including various quilts, clothing and various toys are in 
fact the personal property of the minor child Heather and 
that her property should be with her, except that the 
plaintiff should retain such clothing and toys as would be 
necessary for her while she visits with the plaintiff in the 
plaintiff's home. The plaintiff also has possession of two 
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keepsake dolls and cabbage patch dolls which are the 
property of the minor child Heather. Those items should 
remain in the possession of the plaintiff for the benefit of 
the minor child, Heather. All other items of personal 
property of the minor child should be turned over to the 
defendant for the use and benefit of the minor child, 
Heather. 
14. Each of the parties, prior to the commencement 
of this action, had their own personal property in their 
possession and those properties are to be the property of 
the person who has them in* their possession. Provided, 
however, that there was introduced at the time of trial, a 
list of wedding gifts which the parties have agreed would be 
divided and are listed on the attached sheet. All items 
bearing a check were to be turned over to the defendant as 
his sole and separate property. The remaining items of 
wedding gifts were to become the personal property of the 
plaintiff and should be delivered to the defendant 
immediately. 
15. The defendant has in his possession the 1978 
Pickup truck, a VCR and television, which the plaintiff has 
indicated she does not claim an interest in and they should 
be the property of the defendant. 
16. During the course of the trial, testimony was 
given concerning the various quilts and the court finds, as 
a matter of fact, that all the quilts, other than the quilt 
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that belonged to the child, should become the property of 
the plaintiff. 
17. The Court further finds that with regard to the 
debts of the parties that each of the parties should be 
required to pay any debts that they may have incurred since 
the time of their separation. Inasmuch as the plaintiff, at 
the time of the birth of the minor child, Kevin, chose not 
to use the medical facilities available to her without her 
cost and which was provided by the defendant through his 
military service, that the plaintiff should be required to 
pay any and all medical bills that may have been incurred in 
connection with the birth of the child, Kevin. The Court, 
however, finds that the defendant should pay the debts and 
obligations due and owing to the Utah Valley Credit Union, 
of approximately $2400.00 and the obligation for the jewelry 
purchased by the parties in the sum of approximately $400.00 
and the J. C. Penney Account in the sum of approximately 
$300.00. 
18. The Court finds as a matter of fact that it 
would be in the best interests of the children that the 
transfer of custody occur immediately after the court 
hearing of November 13, 1987 and the transfer of all 
properties occur immediately thereafter. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
enters its: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That each of the parties are fit and proper 
persons to have the care, custody and control of the minor 
children and that each of the parties should be awarded 
joint custody of the two minor children, with the defendant 
having primary care for the minor child Heather and the 
plaintiff having primary care for the minor child Kevin. It 
being the specific intention of the Court that each of the 
parties share with one another, any and all medical matters, 
school matters, church matters or social matters involving 
the minor children. 
2. That neither party has health and Accident 
and/or dental insurance coverage for the children at this 
time. Each should be required to pay one-half of all 
medical costs that are incurred by each child in each home. 
3. That defendant is to pay the sum of $80.00 per 
month as and for child support for the minor child Kevin, 
which child resides in the home of the plaintiff. The Court 
will hold in abeyance any order that the plaintiff pay to 
the defendant child support for the support of the minor 
child Heather. That at such time as the plaintiff finishes 
her schooling, that the Court would expect the Uniform Child 
Support Schedule to apply in determining the child support 
that the plaintiff would be required to pay to the defendant 
for the support of the minor child Heather. As the 
defendants earning capacity increases the Uniform Child 
Support Schedule should be used to determine the support to 
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be paid to the plaintiff for the support of the minor child 
Kevin. 
4. That there be an evaluation of the child support 
on the 1st of January of each year to determine if the 
Uniform Schedule should dictate a payment of a greater child 
support than that heretofore ordered by the Court. 
5. That visitation for the children and the parents 
should be as follows: 
The plaintiff shall visit with the minor child 
Heather every other weekend and have alternate holidays. 
The defendant shall have visitation rights with the minor 
child Kevin for 45 minutes prior to the time that the minor 
child Heather is delivered to the home of the plaintiff and 
45 minutes when the defendant arrives at the home of the 
plaintiff to pick up the minor child Heather. Provided, 
however, the defendant may, if he so desires, visit with the 
minor child Kevin, between the hours of 3:00 p.m. and 7:00 
p.m. on Saturday. If the defendant is going to exercise the 
visitation rights from 3:00 to 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, the 
plaintiff should be notified 24 hours in advance. However, 
after a period of one year, then the minor children shall 
visit with both of the parents on alternate weekends. It 
being the specific desire of the Court that both children be 
in the home of the same parent on weekends so that each of 
the parents will have the opportunity to have both children 
together in their home on alternate weekends. It is the 
intent of the Court that for the first year that the 
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defendant make the necessary arrangements to deliver the 
child Heather to the home of the plaintiff, inasmuch as 
there is substantial travel distance between the homes of 
the two parties. Provided further, however, after a period 
of one year, the transportation of the minor children shall 
alternate. One weekend it would be the responsibility of 
the plaintiff and the other the responsibility of the 
defendant. 
Summer vacation with the minor children should 
include a full month in each of the homes of both parents, 
so that the mother would have both children in her home from 
June 15th to July 15th of each year. Provided, however, the 
plaintiff would have one weekend with the children in the 
middle of the month. Each of the parties are to notify the 
other party as to which weekend during the summer visitation 
they would desire to exercise their visitation with the 
minor children. 
That there are special events in the lives of both 
parties, such as family reunions and other activities which 
may not fall on the appropriate weekend or during the summer 
month visitation, and consideration for each others needs as 
to a special event should in fact be considered and if 
possible, accommodated or schedules so arranged by both 
parties to meet those needs and desires so far as visitation 
with the minor children. 
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6. That each of the parties are capable of paying 
their own attorney fees and costs incurred in connection 
with this matter. 
7. That certain property, including various quilts, 
clothing and various toys are in fact the personal property 
of the minor child Heather and that her property should be 
wit her, except that the plaintiff should retain such 
clothing and toys as would be necessary for her while she 
visits with the plaintiff in the plaintiff's home. The 
plaintiff also has possession of two keepsake dolls and 
cabbage patch dolls which are the property of the minor 
child Heather. Those items should remain in the possession 
of the plaintiff for the benefit of the minor child, 
Heather. All other items of personal property of the minor 
child should be turned over to the defendant for the use and 
benefit of the minor child, Heather. 
8. That each of the parties, prior to the 
commencement of this action, had their own personal property 
in their possession and those properties are to be the 
property of the person who has them in their possession. 
Provided, however, that there was introduced at the time of 
trial, a list of wedding gifts which the parties have agreed 
would be divided are listed on the attached sheet. All 
items bearing a check were to be turned over to the 
defendant as his sole and separate property. The remaining 
items of wedding gifts were to become the personal property 
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of the plaintiff and should be delivered to the defendant 
immediately.. 
9. That the defendant be awarded as his sole and 
separate property the 1978 Pickup truck, a VCR and 
television, which the plaintiff has indicated she does not 
claim an interest in and they should be the property of the 
defendant. 
10. That all the quilts, other than the quilt that 
belonged to the child, Heather, shall be the property of the 
plaintiff. 
11. That each of the parties be required to pay any 
debts that they may have incurred since the time of their 
separation. Inasmuch as the plaintiff, at the time of the 
birth of the minor child, Kevin, chose not to use the 
medical facilities available to her without her cost and 
which was provided by the defendant through his military 
service, that the plaintiff should be required to pay any 
and all medical bills that may have been incurred in 
connection with the birth of the child, Kevin. The 
defendant shall pay the debts and obligations due and owing 
to the Utah Valley Credit Union, of approximately $2400.00 
and the obligation for the jewelry purchased by the parties 
in the sum of approximately $400.00 and the J. C. Penney 
Account in the sum of approximately $3 00.00 and hold the 
defendant harmless therefrom. 
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•12. That the transfer of custody occur 
immediately after the court hearing of November 13, 1987 and 
the transfer of all properties occur immediately thereafter. 
DATED this.^th day ofriaaua^y, 1988. • 
'"..^iC, / 
--DiSTRICT COURT4; JUDGE 7~~ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
ROBERT L. NEELEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
IN AND FOR THE 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
JANETTE DEEBEN 
VS. 
DERICK.R. DEEBEN 
Plaintiff 
Defendant J 
Date 
MINUTE ENTRY 
January 19, 1988 
Case No. 
40735 
DOUGLAS L CORNABY, Judge 
Nancy Davis, Reporter 
Kathy Potts, Clerk 
This matter comes before the Court for Plaintiff's Motion to 
Stay Judgment. The plaintiff is present and represented by 
Robert Neeley. The defendant is present and represented by Dale 
Stratford. 
Mr. Neeley presents oral argument. Mr. Stratford presents 
oral argument. 
The transcript of the court's ruling will be appended to the 
findings of fact prepared by Dale Stratford. The court will deny 
Mr. Neeley's motion to reconsider entering the order of custody. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
JANETTE DEEBEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DERICK R. DEEBEN, 
Defendant. 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF 
PROCEEDINGS 
: Civil No. 40735 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Friday, November 13, 1987, 
the above-entitled matter came on for TRIAL in the Second 
Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of 
Utah, before the HONORABLE DOUGLAS L CORNABY, Presiding. 
* * * * 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
ROBERT L. NEELEY 
Attorney at Law 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
DALE E. STRATFORD 
Attorney at Law 
1218 First Security Bank 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Nancy H. Davis, C.S.R. 
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THE COURT: The Court will make the following 
findings and decision: First, that the plaintiff was an 
actual and bona fide resident of Davis County for at least 
three months prior to the filing of this action, it having 
been filed on January 12, 1987. Plaintiff and defendant are 
husband and wife having married on September 6, 1984 at 
Sunset, Utah. Two children have been born issue of the 
marriage, Heather Lyn Deeben, born March 1st, 1985 and Kevin 
Roy Deeben, born July 1st, 1987. 
The Court will allow the complaint to be amended as 
requested by counsel to provide for irreconcilable differences 
between the parties and we will find that there are 
irreconcilable differences that have made the continuation of 
the marriage impossible and we will grant a mutual divorce to 
each party. Award no alimony to either party. One appears as 
capable as the other of supporting the family. 
While the plaintiff has the very small child in her 
home at the current time to raise and care for, she has, 
nevertheless, made arrangements to work outside of the home, 
apparently, at her own choice and so, expects her to go on 
doing that is not unreasonable. To suggest that the 
defendant, on the other hand, has not supported his family 
after getting out of the service is, apparently, not fair nor 
correct. 
While he hasn't supported his wife, he, apparently, 
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paid on a regular basis $80 per child per month. Apparently, 
that is the only thing he has been required by the Court to 
do. While he.was in the service he was required to spend or 
pay $240 a month which, apparently, he paid each and every 
month and the Court will find that he did pay it for the month 
of August, 1987 as well as the other months. 
Perhaps the biggest concern in this matter today, of 
course, has been joint—or child custody and the Court is 
going to direct that there be joint custody between both the 
plaintiff and the defendant with the defendant to have the 
primary custody of Heather and the plaintiff to have the 
primary custody of Kevin. Each of the parties, apparently, 
neither party actually has health and accident and dental 
insurance covering the children at this time. Each will be 
required to pay one-half of all medical costs that are 
incurred by each child in each home. 
This joint custody, while one parent that I have 
granted the primary custody to, it's stated specifically joint 
custody and it means joint in the sense that you will share 
medical matters, school matters, church matters and social 
matters. r v 
This case has not been free of disagreements between 
the parties in visitation and so on. The only problem now is 
that I suppose any rubbing of the hands or the knee or 
whatever it may be on the sandpaper rubs both ways. So, I 
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assume that you will take the Court to heart in both and both 
cooperate. Without cooperation you will go on having the 
disappointments and problems between you. 
At this time the Court is going to direct that the 
defendant pay $80 per month child support to the plaintiff for 
the child Kevin. I am not going to make a determination at 
this time that the plaintiff should pay any child support to 
the defendant for Heather, but at such time as she finishes 
her schooling, would expect that the Uniform Child Support 
Schedule would come into place and at that point she would be 
required to pay the amount to him just exactly the same as any 
time that his job, through the Uniform Child Support Schedule, 
justifies a higher than $80 a month, but it will not be less 
than that amount. Uniform Schedule indicates that he should 
be paying higher than that. It will be based on the schedule. 
Not that every single time there is a minor change, but 
certainly that needs to be evaluated at least on the first of 
January of every year. 
MR. NEELEY: Your Honor, I am concerned—confused. 
Who have you awarded— 
THE COURT: Defendant is going to Heather and the 
plaintiff is going to Kevin, even though counsel have argued 
that the children should not be split up, the bonding is not 
the same as with children when they are older, when they 
become better acquainted, when they have been long associated 
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with each other and I am not even so sure when the bonding 
becomes so strong that either party should be denied a right 
to have custody, just so that the parent can be satisfied with 
the total custody or no custody, but that's not the basis for 
the Court doing it here. 
Now, with regard to visitation. The visitation will 
continue for the defendant as it has been in the past so far 
as Kevin is concerned. Forty-five minutes each time he makes 
a trip up to see the child. However, if he wants to make a 
trip up on Saturday and spend a period of time like from 3:00 
to 7:00 with the child, the Court finds no problem in that 
whatsoever. If the mother can work from 3:00 to 7:00, 
certainly the father can take care of the child outside of the 
home from 3:00 to 7:00. I would think it would take some 
communication between the parties to arrange for the care of 
the child. 
As such time as the child is one year old, I am 
going to direct that then alternating visitation will begin on 
the weekends and I am going to direct that when that takes 
place that the plaintiff is going to have the weekend and 
alternating holiday visitation with Heather and vice versa 
because the children are to be in the same home each time that 
there is weekend visitation. 
So, when the mother is having visitation, they will 
both be there and when the defendant is having visitation, 
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they will both be there. Now, that's not now, but after the 
child is one year of age. 
'. The Court thinks that for summer visitation that 
each party should have an opportunity of having both children 
in the home for an uninterrupted period of time, almost 
uninterrupted. A full month. I am going to let, during the 
time of June 15 to July 15, I am going to let the mother have 
both children in the home, except for one weekend visitation 
period right in the middle, unless the parties happen to be 
going out of state on a vacation and then during the month of 
July 15 or July 16 through August 15, then the defendant will 
have both children in the home. 
When the one weekend of visitation occurs, I am 
going to require the defendant to take care of the 
transportation and when the next period of visitation comes, I 
am going to require the plaintiff to take care of the 
transportation both ways. I am going to come back to my 
reasons. 
MR. STRATFORD: That's after the child reaches one? 
THE COURT: That's right. Until that period of 
time, I am going to just require the defendant to make that 
trip because he needs the.visitation with the child so I am 
going to require that he be the one that take it and, of 
course, these are based on the fact that I think that Heather 
will be best cared for if she is in the home with his 
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parents. I am not so sure that current living arrangements he 
has is persuasive to the Court that it's conducive to the 
raising of a daughter. I am not telling him he has to do it, 
but- this is joint custody. It doesn't take a big change to 
change it and if I think there's anything of an untowarded 
nature that is going to make a change, I will have to make it, j 
but I am not going to tell him how to run his life. j 
Now, there's some other questions and I am going to 
refer to them now. Each party will pay their own attorney 
fee. The defendant will be awarded those family portraits. 
The quilts that v/ere argued over was a gift to the child and 
that property, along with all the clothes that belong to the 
child, except for enough for the plaintiff to be able to 
clothe Heather while she is there visiting, will be turned 
over to the defendant. 
All of the clothes and all of the toys except for 
some of those on the same basis because those are the property 
of the child and not the property of the parents and likewise, 
the quilts. There's some question over what belongs, 
apparently, to the child. 
Now, each party is awarded the property in their own 
possession with being specific, except for what I changed 
here. The defendant is awarded that '78 pickup that he talked 
about, VCR and TV. There are, apparently, more than one quilt 
and the one quilt I am talking about is the one quilt that 
7 
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was spoken of as a quilt to the—a gift to the child, Heather. 
The others belong to the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff will keep the two keepsake dolls and 
Cabbage Patch dolls for the sake of the child. They are the 
child's, but I am going to let her specifically keep that 
property in her possession. 
MR. STRATFORD: The defendant or the plaintiff? 
THE COURT: The plaintiff. What did I say. 
MR. STRATFORD: The defendant. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. STRATFORD: Then you said her and I couldn't put 
them two together. 
THE COURT: The quilt, other than the one that 
belongs to the child — the quilts other than the one belonging 
to the child, the two keepsake dolls and Cabbage Patch dolls 
to the plaintiff. It's probably better off if I said husband 
and wife so we don't get the confusion. 
With regard to the debts, each party is going to be 
required to pay any debts they may have incurred since the 
time of their separation. The plaintiff is going to be 
required to pay any medical bills that may have been incurred 
in the birth of the child-because she chose not to use that 
medical attention which was available to her without cost 
through the military service. 
On the other hand, the Court is going to require 
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the defendant to pay the debt to the Utah Valley Credit Union 
of about $2,400, jewelry of about $400 and the J. C. Penney 
bill of $300. 
Now, my reasons and these, of course, need to be 
stated as to why I have done what I have with the custody. 
Parties are really not going to like what I say about it but 
we don't lightly change custody as parties know and there's 
always the temptation, of course, to immediately file an 
appeal and I don't care if parties file an appeal. I just 
explain why I am doing what I am doing. It's not to be cruel 
to each other but to let you know why I did what I did and 
it's not always kind in what I have to say. 
So, first, I think there has been some criticism of 
the defendant because of his military service. That he quit 
the military service when he had a good job and could have 
gone on making good money and supporting the family. The _ 
Court finds that the defendant gave up what would be a good 
job for the benefit of the possibility of having custody of 
his child and to be a responsible parent. That's why he—if 
net the primary reason, certainly one of the primary reasons 
he left the military service. There was no chance in the 
world he would have been granted that custody if he remained 
in the military service with assignments that would certainly 
take him to Germany. 
There is another consideration just with the 
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military that we can't—normally our appellate courts have 
said we will talk about custody matters. We will pretty much 
leave the children where they have been unless there's some 
major reason for changing them. If we followed that in this 
kind of a case we would never consider the person who is in 
the military service for custody because they are always 
subject to that kind of a change of duty and that like the 
plaintiff—or not like the defendant, husband, was on his six 
months of basic training, there was no way that the family 
could be together. •- ^ 
So, you can say, well, see, the mother was the 
primary custodian during that period of time and she was. 
Then, of course, they spent six, seven months together while 
they were down in Texas and then major problems developed that 
caused them to separate and she moved back to Utah which made 
for practical purposes visitation impossible or custody 
impossible without some court granting custody there. So, 
there is a special consideration that must be given to these 
military circumstances that would not be there if both parties 
were in the State of Utah. 
*— 
Now, there have been problems between the parties 
while they were married. .This report that I have got from 
Steven Watson says the parties have argued a good deal and had 
problems between them in their marriage and, of course, he has 
listened to both parties to get that information and then what 
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he could observe- It would seem to the Court that each party 
is an equal contributor in whatever inability to get along in 
the marriage has been. One no more or less than the other. 
With regard to the physical altercations they have 
had and, apparently, they have had a number of them and it has 
been pointed .out that the husband has reacted violently on 
times and has shaken or slapped the wife, but not greatly out 
of control. Not the violence that so often we see in 
marriages where one doubles up a fist and breaks a jaw or 
breaks an eye or breaks an arm or something else. 
Now, mind you, I don't condone it. No man, no woman 
has the right, married or unmarried, to use physical force on 
another person. The fact of a marriage relationship does not 
give one the right to do something that is otherwise illegal. 
It's still illegal. It's still improper, but I am saying that 
I recognize that it occurred. 
I recognize, too, that these didn't always occur 
just because the defendant or husband got angry. The wife was 
often the agitator and often the instigator. It involved 
slapping and kicking and almost always taunting and while, 
what we normally—if we take this outside of the home and 
something like this happens and a battery takes place or an 
assault takes place where somebody punches somebody in the 
mouth and we look to the provocation and we say, what's the 
provocation. Why do they do what they do? If there's great 
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provocation, we don't excuse them but my goodness, we 
certainly take it into account when we impose a sentence for 
it. 
That's all I say in this case. There's a good deal 
of provocation and also actual involvement on the part of the 
wife as it was on the part of the husband. I am not condoning 
either one because it's improper in a marriage as it is out. 
With regard to love of the children, I am absolutely 
satisfied that both parties love the children. They want what 
is best for the children. Certainly, as the husband took a 
hardship discharge from the military so that he could 
hopefully have custody of one or both of these children, I'm 
sure if the same option were left to the wife she would do the 
same thing. 
The evidence does show that the wife has been the 
primary caretaker, but the primary caretaker must be put in to 
context of this military service that I spoke of and being in 
the military service, had he not been in the military service, 
they would have probably ranked in my mind as jointly being 
caretakers. I am not sure one would be any more prime than 
the other, while I am recognizing that the wife said he was 
basically a lazy bum and wouldn't do things. He would watch 
TV and so on while I worked and I am not saying you said that 
today, but I am just repeating it from what Mr. Watson has 
stated in his report here. 
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I think that he had enough concern that he was with 
the child and did things with the child and probably hadn't 
come to the point that so many of us are today in this world 
that ERA is demanding equality. I don't know if we are ever 
going to get it, but it certainly has changed lifestyles, 
anyway, as this hearing is evident of. 
Now, I think both parties are tied to their parent's 
apron strings and there's some positive and some negative 
aspects to that. As I listened to both parents tell what 
their son or son-in-law or daughter-in-law and in the report 
what they did and didn't do, I am not so sure these young 
people are making all the decisions they need to make for 
themselves. When there's hard problems between them, they 
shouldn't have been asking mom and dad. They should have been 
asking each other. 
And sure, they will make mistakes and in doing that--
but, you grandparents stop and tell me if you didn't make the 
same mistakes, you know, when you were young. I know you did. 
I made a lot of the same mistakes and now that I know my 
parents a little better, I know they made some of those same 
mistakes. They were not perfect, but they had a son that was 
not perfect either. I have six children and my children don't 
think their dad is perfect and is not. I have six children 
and my six children are not perfect either. 
What I am trying to point out is that sometimes, 
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hopefully not very often, we learn by experience and we learn 
good through experience and there needs to be a point where 
both of these parties cut those ties with the parent's apron 
strings. I am not suggesting that be done right now. I think 
while both these parties have got these children to care for 
and they are both trying to get through school and both 
finding the necessity of working, that is probably a great 
support, but they still ought to basically be able to make 
some of those basic decisions themselves and parents ought to, 
being a little crude, keep your nose out or make them or even 
insist they make them. 
You know, I recall back when I got married and my 
wife's mother wanted to know if she could give her a coat and 
I said, "No." And she said, "Why not?" I said, "Because you 
need it." I was willing that anything that she didn't need 
they could give to her, but anything she needed I didn't want 
them to give to her because I didn't want to undermine my 
right as a husband and, you see, as a father in that home. 
I am telling them that these same kind of decisions 
have to be made by these two and I recognize there is a 
difference today. Not a counseling session to get them back 
together. 
Now, another problem. There have been problems in 
the visitation and where one child is in each home, I suppose 
you just have to be as reasonable with one as you are with the 
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other and I know we are talking about another six, eight 
2 months, but that's such a small length of time. We are 
3 talking about 18 years here today. We.are just not talking 
4 about six or eight months and I think you need to cooperate 
5 with each other. You need to try to think about what is fair 
g and if some special event is important to the other party and 
7 they want some visitation and they have got no entitlement to 
3 it, you ought to let them take and vice versa. If your family 
9 is having a family reunion and you wanted the children and 
10 it's his time to have them, boy, I think there ought to be 
11 give and take. 
12 But, I have been pretty definite in what I ruled out 
13 because I know there have been problems in the past and I 
14 think that the Gyver family have contributed to that somewhat. 
15 I don't think that the defendant and his parents have always 
lg been given the visitation under the court's order that they 
17 have a right to. 
18 Now, a consideration for this, too, is that at the 
19 time while the parties were in Texas together, the Court does 
20 not believe Janette primarily cared for the child, Heather. 
21 Where there was the claim of severe diaper rash and the Court 
22 is inclined to—understanding that people today—I am inclined 
23 to believe that and I think in that case, while I donft think 
24 the husband is what I call a fully-matured person, that's not 
25 a terrible criticism, but I don't think you are a 
15 
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fully-matured person. 
Basically/ in that Texas situation, he showed a 
disposition, both to visit with the children and to—and when 
he recognized the problem, to immediately do something about 
it and even recognized when there was a problem that something 
was done about it. He had no choice as to his thing, his work 
goes on. That's part of his military and I suppose that may 
create a lot of problems, but that's part of his military 
life, even if it's for a short period of four years. 
I can't exclude Janette, the threats of suicide. I 
don't have to believe that they were serious, but they are 
certainly suggestive of psychological problems and I am not 
even sure that you haven't put them all behind you. I hope 
you have. Certainly, the husband has shown nothing of a 
psychological nature that would interfere with his ability to 
properly care for Heather. 
There has been an allegation of the paregoric and I 
have listened to it. I think I tend to believe that you were 
using paregoric improperly and without a doctor's prescription 
on the children. I would hope that you never do that. That 
any prescription drug for young children had never ought to be 
done and even the suggestion, of course, and you may not have 
known about it, is that, of course, Kevin, if you take 
paregoric it may, of course, have an effect on Kevin as you 
have to ask doctors about when you are nursing a young child 
16 
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because they can often be transmitted from one to the—from 
the mother to the child through the milk. 
Certainly there's a consideration that the 
plaintiff's home or the wife's home seems to be almost too 
crowded for the whole family, but it's not in and of itself a 
determining factor. It's just another one of those things, 
when you put it all together, while I find that the 
defendant's home has plenty of room, if we talk about the 
parent's home in Salem as opposed to the apartment. 
Those are my rulings-, my reasons. Any questions 
from either one of you? You did submit a list called 
Defendant's Exhibit 1. You agreed by stipulation that that 
would be part of it and I suppose wherever it is, that's the 
part that if it is there, that the defendant is going to be 
given; is that correct? 
MR. STRATFORD: That's our agreement, yeah. 
THE COURT: Yes. Anything else? 
•MR. STRATFORD: Anything that has the name of 
Janette on it, we— 
MR. NEELEY: When does it take place, your Honor? 
THE COURT: It takes place immediately but I think 
where there is going to be a change, you hadn't ought to talk 
about the change until Sunday evening since we are on Friday. 
Then, do you want me to spell out when every other weekend 
starts or I suppose you can easily calculate it to two weeks 
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from today as I can. 
MR. NEELEY: No. 
THE COURT: Direct that Mr. Stratford, that you draw 
the papers. 
MR. STRATFORD: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any questions? Okay. That's all. 
Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
-0O0-
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In the Second Judicial District Court 
in and for the 
County of Davis, State of Utah 
JCv'7 - n w _ 
i^ T 
C7^&__ 
.;/:« 
JANETTE DEEBEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DERICK R. DEEBEN, 
Defendant. 
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
OF FACT 
Civil No. 40735 
This court received this case back from the Court of Appeals 
on June 10, 1988. On July 15, 1988, this court noticed it on the 
calendar for a hearing on August 9, 1988. On July 22, 1988, 
counsel for the defendant, Dale E. Stratford, filed a motion to 
amend findings of fact nunc pro tunc. This motion was 
accompanied by amended findings of fact. No one appeared for the 
August 9, 1988, hearing but the court was informed that Mr. 
Stratford had suffered a heart attack and been operated on and 
would be out of the office for at least one month. The court 
directed plaintiff's counsel, Robert L. Neeley to submit a 
memorandum. The court received this memorandum on September 14, 
1988. The court received nothing further from the defendant so 
it had the court clerk phone defendant's counsel on October 20, 
1988, and ask him to contact plaintiff's counsel and confer with 
the court. The plaintiff's counsel recently notified this court 
that he has not been contacted by defendant's counsel. The court 
is of the belief that it can proceed without anything further 
from either counsel and will proceed to make additional findings 
of fact. 
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V 4 
The court originally found that both parties were fit and 
proper persons to be custodial parents. The court is not 
changing this basic finding. 
It is in the best interest of the children that the 
plaintiff and defendant be awarded joint custody but that Janette 
Deeben be awarded the physical care, custody, and control of 
Kevin Roy Deeben, born July 1, 1987, and that Derick R. Deeben be 
awarded the physical care, custody, and control of Heather Lyn 
Deeben. 
The court has this day adopted the amended findings of fact 
as its own which were submitted by the defendant on July 22, 
1988. In addition the court is going to make more specific 
findings of fact as follows: 
(1) The parties married on September 4, 1984, and in early 
1986 the defendant entered military service in the Army. He was 
in New Jersey for basic training until the first of July. The 
parties then moved to Fort Hood, Texas. In January, 1987, the 
plaintiff returned to Utah. The parties were not getting along 
during this time. There were altercations. Each party used 
violence on the other party. The defendant hit and the plaintiff 
slapped and kicked. Both equally participated in provoking the 
fights and in fighting. Neither was just acting in reasonable 
self defense. The defendant was still in Fort Hood when this 
action was filed. He was forced to take a hardship discharge or 
be transferred to Germany. He chose the hardship discharge so 
that he could fight for custody of his children. 
(2) The plaintiff has been the primary caretaker the 
majority of the time until the court's ruling on January 19, 
1988. This was out of necessity, however, because of the 
defendant's military assignments during the year 1987. The 
plaintiff was not an ideal caretaker, however. The child was not 
always properly fed, diapered, or put to bed at a reasonable hour 
by the plaintiff. The defendant on returning at late hours from 
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military duty would on occasion have to fill those needs• The 
defendant spent as much time as a caretaker of the child as the 
plaintiff when he was in the home and not filling military 
duties• 
(3) The plaintiff used paregoric on the child on occasions 
when it was not medically necessary. This made the child 
lethargic and unable to sleep properly and neared the point of 
being habit forming. 
(4) The plaintiff has been a better custodian of the 
children, since returning to Utah and being in the home of her 
parents where she had the counsel and assistance of her parents 
and sisters. 
The court clerk is directed to send copies of these findings 
of fact to counsel and to return the file to the Court of 
Appeals. 
Dated November 2, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ v r 
JUDG|T/ T' - ^ / / 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Robert L. Neeley, 2485 
Grant Avenue, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84401 and Dale E. Stratford, 
1218 First Security Bank, Ogden, Utah 84401 on November 3, 1988. 
i^/Lc J2a : u-u V"—,' t \u-
Deputy Cl'erk 
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TESTIMONY (IN PART) OF 
DERICK R. DEEBEN 
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because she had agreed to go to my 
her family and she agreed to go to 
family. We had 
my family and in 
co get ready we had the argument about what we should 
Heather wear and she argued and she never wants to go 
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1 to my parent's at all. Heather was wanting to go. Then she 
2 picked up the knife, held it against her chest and said she 
3 was going to commit suicide. I told her I would divorce her 
4 if she kept threatening things like this and not changing my 
5 daughter's diaper, not keeping the rashes off, 
6 Q Letfs get back to the knife incident before we leave 
7 that. Was the point of the knife pressed against her body or 
8 clothing? _ 
9 A Yes, it was. 
10 Q She indicated it v/as "just held out in front of her. 
11 A It was not held out in front of her. It was held 
12 against her chest. 
13 Q Did it appear she had every intention of doing 
14 something with that knife? 
15 A Yes, it did. 
16 Q , What did you do in response to that knife? 
17 A I slapped the knife out of her hand. I had my 
18 daughter in my left arm. I then, with my forearm, shoved her 
19 back against the wall, laid my daughter on the table that v/as 
20 right there by the telephone. 
21 Q What did you do with the knife? 
22 A I left the knife laying in the middle of the floor 
23 and I called the police immediately. 
24 Q What v/as the purpose in calling the police rather 
25 than the doctor? 
81 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
] | A To try to get some help to control her. She was 
2 being- very vicious, hitting, kicking and clawing at me and 
3 several of these hittings were coming extremely close to my 
4 daughter. 
5 Q Now, you indicated also that there are various times 
6 that you noticed some difficulty with her care of Heather. 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Have you noticed any difference between the care of 
9 Heather when she was by herself or within the family. 
10 relationship with you as opposed to the care of Heather now? 
11 A Yes, I have. 
12 Q What is the difference? 
13 A The difference now it seems is that she is either 
141 grown up enough to keep Heather's diapers changed where rashes 
15 aren't on her and that Heather is being fed consistently now. 
16 THE COURT: Isn't she potty trained yet? 
17 THE WITNESS: Yes. Heather is potty trained now. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 THE WITNESS: While I was in Texas with her on 
20 several occasions I would come home as late as midnight, even 
21 two in the morning on one incident. Heather was in front of 
22 the fridge screaming because she had not eaten all night. 
23 Janette was in front of the TV. I asked her why. Janette 
24 stated that she was a big girl and that she could take care of 
25 herself. 
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Q (By Mr. Stratford) Did you have occasion on more 
than one time to form an opinion or see—let's back up. Did 
you have occasion to see any problems, physical problems with 
Heather as a result of the care or lack of care by her mother 
when you returned from the field? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you tell us what you found and what you saw. 
A On several occasions upon returning from the field, 
I would find Heather extremely diaper-rashed. Her bottom 
would be bleeding from the rashes. At these times we did take 
her into the doctor on a couple of occasions and he did 
prescribe some medication. He stated then that the diapers 
needed to be consistently changed. 
Q And while you were present in the home, did you have 
occasion to change diapers and participate in the care of the 
child? 
A Oh, yes. Several times. My daughter would, in 
fact, tell her mother she did not want her mother to bathe her 
and she would ask for me by name. 
THE COURT: I think at this point we will take a 
noon recess. Be back at 1:30 
(Whereupon, a luncheon recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: Have your witness come back up and let's 
proceed. 
MR. STRATFORD: By way of housekeeping items, if 
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it please the Court, we have introduced Exhibit 1, Defendant's 
Exhibit 1, which was a list of wedding gifts received and 
during the noon hour we wrote' up a handwritten list which I 
think the parties have agreed would satisfy the questions we 
are asking and so if we can have some copies made, then we can 
supply copies to each counsel and we can substitute this in 
lieu of the other list. Is that agreeable? 
MR. NEELEY: Sure. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) 
BY MR. STRATFORD: 
Q Now, you are Derick Deeben who was on the stand 
prior to the noon break. 
A Yes. 
Q Do you recognize the oath you took this morning is 
still binding upon you and you still have an obligation now as 
you did then. 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Now, then, at the time we concluded this morning, 
you were concerned about what change you noticed between the 
time that she—that your wife, Janette, has returned to her 
family home as opposed to when she was taking care of the 
children when she was by herself. I believe that's where we 
left it; was it not? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q Would you tell the Court what differences you have 
84 
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noticed or what appears to you to be different than it was at 
the time that Janette was by herself or with you and her 
ability to tend to the children. 
A Since she has been home with her family I feel that 
she has actually put a little more, shall I say, desire into 
insuring that the children1s welfare is better. When she was 
in Texas there was no real concern with the children. She, 
having stated that she is old enough and that she can take 
care of herself, as far as getting food out of the fridge, 
making Heather actually open the fridge and getting her own 
food out, macaroni and cheese, to be exact, and in Tupperware 
containers. 
Q Now, there has also been some question raised about 
your concern about marks appearing on the child's body. Would 
you indicate to the Court—Janette made the statement. You 
heard the statement during her direct examination. 
A Yes. 
Q That she had been referred for purposes of child 
abuse as far as the mark was concerned. 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Would you tell the Court what you observed and what, 
if anything, that Heather did in connection with those marks. 
A Yes. When Heather came down to our home we noticed 
a bruise on her thigh, approximately a 3 3-degree angle coming 
down from the front towards the back on the outside of her 
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thigh in the upper two-thirds of her thigh. 
Q So, we are not talking about a small round bruise. 
What are we talking about? •' 
A We are talking about something that was 
approximately three-eighths inch wide and approximately an 
inch to an inch and a half in length. The bruise was fairly 
black. It was a couple days old before I saw it for the first 
time which was when I picked her up to take her home. We do 
have a picture of that on video tape. 
Q And did anything unusual happen when you returned 
Heather to the Gyver home after that weekend? 
A Yes, it did. Heather went in and we entered through 
the kitchen or the back door into the kitchen. Heather 
stepped into the living room area. 
Q All right. Who was present at that time? 
A Myself, my little brother, my little sister, 
Mrs. Gyver and Janette. I am not sure if Janette's sisters 
were there or not. I am not sure of that. Heather walked 
into the corner of the living room and picked up, v/hat I would 
say would be a black powder ramrod. Walked out and said, 
"My grandpa hit me with this,"at which time, Mrs. Gyver turned 
around and grabbed the ramrod, put it back in the corner, took 
Heather1s arm and said, "Eb, your grandpa couldn't have hit you 
with that because he is not here right now." 
Then she led her into the kitchen and they started—she 
36 
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put a fingerful of frosting into her mouth and then Janette 
said, don't eat too much frosting, you will get sick and at 
the same time still giving her more frosting. . • . 
Q Did you try to explore or ask what happened or what 
this was all about? 
A Yes, I did. I asked what had happened' and Janette 
stated, well, she fell off of her bike and I said, okay and I 
left it at that. I believe what my daughter said and I was 
extremely concerned. Before we had taken her back, which was 
Sunday, that morning I had taken her over to the church house 
where our family physician was at the time and I got him out 
of the meeting and I asked him if he would take a look at it 
so he could see how he felt about it because I didn't want to 
jump to any conclusions. 
Q And based upon what he said, what did you do? 
A Based upon what he said, he said--
Q I don't want to know what he said. Just tell me 
what you did as a result of what he told you. 
A Yes, that is correct. 
Q What did you do? What was your reaction? 
A Well, what I done is, I took Heather back and asked 
them'what had happened. 
Q By them, you mean the people at the Gyver home? 
A Meaning the Gyvers and I was told by Dr. Clark 
t h a t - - •'•:•.. 
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that. Would you tell the Court what causes you concern about 
that and why you registered this concern. 
A Yes. On several occasions when we would pick up 
Heather for the weekend, upon trying to put her to bed, she 
wouldn't go to sleep. She would either be completely 
lethargic but not v/illing to sleep or she would be almost 
hyperactive and she would stay up extremely late at night, 
much like—I have seen people on drug withdrawals. She then 
would say before she would go to bed, I need my medicine. 
Q Has that happened on-more than one occasion? 
A Yes. Several occasions. 
Q Now, then, when you have returned Heather to the 
Gyver home and you had occasion to take the young child, 
Kevin, have you noticed anything unusual or out of the 
ordinary so far as Kevin is concerned? 
A- Yes. Up until the report was filed with the 
Division of Family Services about the paregoric, after Heather 
asked for it by name, Kevin was exceedingly lethargic, being 
not like a young child should be at that time of evening and 
we would have a rough time waking him up for anything. 
When he was awake he would lay there. He wouldn't play. 
We would have toys there for him. He wouldn't even watch 
them. After the report was made, the next time we picked him 
up he was active and like a child his own age. 
Q So, you noticed a substantial difference? 
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have indicated that you noticed some things that concerned you 
about Heather's well-being and about her receiving medication 
and/or care in the Gyver home. Would you indicate to the 
Court what your concerns were and the reasons therefore. 
A We picked her up on every other weekend and the 
last, probably from the mid of September—I'm not sure of the 
exact dates. I have it documented. Anyway, Heather—we would 
get her ready for bed and she would ask for medication. We 
discussed it, what medication would Heather be getting and we 
would talk to her and we would,say, "Heather, you don't need 
medication." 
Then in October Derick would try to get her to bed and I, 
of course, with the rest of the family and finally at 3:00 he 
came to me and said, "Mom. She keeps asking for medication 
and she said she has a tummy ache." He said, "Do you think 
she is getting the flu?" Well, when we got up and she didn't 
have a fever or anything like that but she kept asking for 
this medicine—and I said, "Well, I don't know what 
medication, but she has asked for it a lot of times." 
Usually Heather is not one that wanted to take medication 
and that surprised me that she had been asking for it because 
any time, you know, when we got medication from the doctor to 
give her when she had strep throat, she didn't want to take it 
and we would have to talk to her about it and then she would 
take it. 
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11
 Yes. I have to have my paregoric. I can't sleep without it. 
I have a tummy ache." 
Q And did you notice anything different in her 
behavior? 
A She was agitated. She wouldn't sleep but yet 
sometimes she played really good, but other times she would be 
so much more uptight, more nervous. I was concerned, the fact 
that she just wouldn't sleep and we couldn't get her settled 
down and now she takes a nap each day we have her and she goes 
to bed good at night. We don't have any problems and she goes 
right to sleep. 
Q That's after the question arose as to the paregoric 
was settled? 
A Yes. It has been the last two weekends we noticed. 
Q A change? 
A A change in her. 
Q Did you notice anything unusual about the child, 
Kevin? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q Would you tell us what, if anything, you observed 
about the child, Kevin. Let me preface that. As I understand 
it, you had the child for 45 minutes when you picked up 
Heather and then when you came back Sunday night you had the 
child approximately for approximately two hours. What, if 
anything, unusual did you notice about the child? 
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1 paregoric being in the house and some of the problems that, 
2 I apparently, you were concerned about and after the report was, 
3 I in fact, made, did you notice any change about the child? 
4 A Yes. We picked him up on Friday night. I didn't 
5 notice too much change then, but then when we came back for 
Q I two hours Sunday night he was totally different. We could 
7 crinkle paper off to the side and he would turn his head where 
3 before he would never do that. There was no eye movement at 
9 all before. He was watching objects as we moved them. He 
lo| could lift himself up in his little seat and he would hand 
H onto my fingers whereas before he was just slumped. There was 
12 nothing there. He was laughing. He was kicking. He was 
13 playing with his hands. These are all normal things that a 
14 child should be doing at that age and he didn't go to sleep 
15 until we would bring him home and he would fall asleep in the 
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